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EU-Asia Free Trade Agreements as tools for social norm/legislation transfer 
 
 
This article builds on previous work which investigates the tension that exists between the EU 
internal and international legal obligations to achieve gender equality in all its activities, and the lack 
of actual implementation of this value in the context of trade negotiations with the Asian region.  
We argued that the EU’s willingness to foster good economic relations with key rising markets in 
Asia together with the Asian countries’ systematic rejection of the inclusion of norms in Free Trade 
Agreement create a double barrier for the diffusion of gender equality norms. We also concluded 
that the failure to insert gender equality norms within trade negotiations with Asian countries casts 
serious doubts about the credibility and the global reputation of the EU (Schimmelfennig 2001) as an 
international gender actor. 
 
In this article, we consider the broader ambit of social norms diffusion in the context of trade 
negotiations between the EU and the Asian countries. We question the use the use of Free Trade 
Agreements as a tool for development and the exportation of social norms. As in the case of gender 
equality, the EU also has ambition as a global norm maker in the area of social norms. However, the 
EU’s economic “nature” means that the promotion of economic growth and the priority of trade 
over other fundamental value can have an impact over the EU’s ability and ambition as a social norm 
exporter.  
 
This article confirms that Asian States demonstrate strong agency in resisting EU norms export’s 
attempt. Previous empirical analysis of a broad range of cases of norm diffusion has showed that 
recipient Asian states of EU norms often actively and vociferously resists and rejects such norms 
(Garcia and Masselot 2014; Shen 2014; Chaban, Kelly, Holland 2014). Asian States are far from 
subdued norm-takers and stand their ground when dealing with the EU. 
 
In order to explore these points, this article is organised into 4 parts. In the first part, the article 
traces the development of the EU social values. It also looks at the externalisation of these social 
values. In particular, it pays attention to the EU relationship with the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). The second part addresses the tension that exists between the EU’s interests and 
its values. In a third part, the article considers the examples of positive outcomes in terms of social 
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clauses resulting from the trade negotiations. It also addresses the difference in approach from the 
EU and its partners. Finally, in the last section, this article outlines the Asian States resistance to 
adopting social clause in the normative field.  
 
Social Values of the EU – the internal story 
Despite a spasmodic development, the social dimension is today a fundamental aspect of the EU.At 
the outset of the European integration project, it was expected that the creation of a functioning 
common market would generate a more harmonious social system. Therefore the ultimate aim for 
social policy was to facilitate economic integration. There was no specific requirement for general 
harmonisation in the field of social policy. It was believed that the market would ensure 
harmonisation of social policies (but without social dumping). The Spaark (1956) and the Ohlin 
(1956) Reports concluded that there was no need for an interventionist social dimension except for 
certain measures against “unfair competition” - This was the case for equal pay between men and 
women (Bain and Masselot 2013) – or measures directly linked to the building of the common 
market such as free movement of workers, the improvement of employment opportunities for 
workers as well as the improvement of working conditions and improving living standards. It was 
generally believed that labour law was a domestic issue, and in fact this policy area remained a 
member state competence. For this reason, the European Commission could only propose Directives 
on social matters if these were directly linked to the elimination of barriers to the internal market, 
hence the involvement in areas related to people as labour, as opposed to a broader understanding 
of social policy as affecting citizens. 
 
However, increasingly the European Commission took on a more entrepreneurial role in social policy 
matters, shifted due to the late 1960’s social unrests; successive enlargements of the Community to 
include states with diverse sets of social systems (the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and 
Norway) and the increasing view that the Community had to be seen as more than a device for 
business. It had become a necessity for the Community to develop a human face for its citizens. 
 
As a result, the Social Action Programme adopted in 1974, led to increased legislative activity and 
harmonisation in the area of social policy. This included the adoption of the Equal Pay Directive; the 
Equal Treatment Directive; Directive on Social Security; a series of health and safety directives; a 
Directive on Mass Redundancies and the Directive on Transfer of Undertakings and Insolvent 
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Employers and well as the setting up of the European Regional Development Fund created to 
address the problem of socio-economic convergence in the Community. 
 
The Single European Act 1986 extended qualified majority voting to Health and Safety matters. This 
facilitated the adoption of the Working Time Directive. It also allowed for an improvement of the 
developing dialogue between management and labour at European level (the so-called “social 
dialogue”), which would become quite important later in relation to the “collective strategy” and the 
adoption of the Parental Leave Directive. 
 
Despite these amendments of the Treaty of Rome, the idea was still that the Community could not 
function properly without the agreement of its citizens. And European citizens needed a social 
approach to the EEC. At the same time unemployment was raising. There was fear of the open 
competition at European level with relocation of large firms. As a result, Jacques Delors lodged his 
plan for “L’Espace Social Européen” which eventually took the form of the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights signed in 1989 by all Member States except the UK. These rights were to 
be implemented through the Social Charter Action Programme, and any measures adopted were to 
be based on the European Community (EC) Treaty. The Action programme was ambitious and lead 
to the enactment of some important pieces of social legislation such as the Directive on Proof of 
Contract of Employment; the Pregnant Workers Directive; the Directive on Posted Workers; and the 
Young Workers Directive. 
 
From the Treaty of Maastricht to Amsterdam to Nice, the Social policy programme went from 
strength to strength. During the Maastricht negotiations there was pressure on Member States to 
expand the social competence of the EC. However, they still met with resistance from the UK. The 
Social Charter was therefore adopted in a protocol attached to the Treaty on the European Union 
(TEU) with an opt-out of the UK. 
 
The Social Policy Agreement broadened the range of measures that could be decided on qualified 
majority vote (information and consultation of workers, equality between men and women, and 
integration of those excluded from the labour market) but it expressly excluded issues of 
remuneration; right of association; right to strike and the right to impose lockouts from EC 
competence. One of the important moves made by the Social Policy Agreement was to increase the 
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role of the Social Partners. In effect they receive power to agree the substance of directives such as 
the Parental Leave Directive. In addition, the TEU introduced the term of “Citizenship”, which under 
the Treaty of Maastricht had little substance. Nevertheless, “Citizenship” would include not only civil 
(basic freedom from State interference) and political (electoral) rights but importantly social rights 
(rights to health care, unemployment insurance, old pension, and welfare). 
 
In 1997 Tony Blair’s Labour government in Britain opted back into the Social Chapter. This lead to 
the incorporation of a Chapter on Social Policy in the Treaty and the Agreement on Social Policy 
which incorporated in the Treaty a new section on the “Union and Citizen”. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam introduced a new Chapter on Employment reflecting the concern of growing 
unemployment in the Union. However the States remained the main actors in the employment field. 
Nevertheless this represented a further shift in view: Social policy was to be an integrated part of EU 
Law. Additionally, a general non-discriminatory provision (Article 13) was included in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. 
 
On 7 December 2000, in a prelude to the Nice Inter-Governmental Conference, the European 
Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission, acting jointly, issued the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the form of a non-binding “solemn proclamation”. The 
recognition of the legal value of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Lisbon Treaty constitutes 
an incontestable advance in social matters. The Charter guarantees a number of fundamental social 
values including: workers' right to information/consultation within the undertaking (Article 27); right 
of bargaining and right to strike (Article 28); right of access to placement services (Article 29); right 
of protection for unjustified dismissal (Article 30); right to fair and just working conditions (Article 
31); prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Article 32); reconciling 
family and professional life (Article 33); social security (Article 34); health care (Article 35). 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon also strengthens the social dimension of the European Union (EU) by 
recognising the social values of the Union in the founding Treaties and provides new objectives for 
social matters. These include full employment, social progress, the fight against social exclusion and 
social protection (Article 3 TEU) and high level of employment, adequate social protection and the 
fight against social exclusion must be taken into account in the development and implementation of 
Union policies (Article 9 TFEU). The later objectives are of application in the EU external policy. 
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The EU and international obligations 
The EU is not only dedicated to social norms internally, it is also concerned with social issues on a 
global level as demonstrated by the close relationship between the EU and the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). Although the EU, as an entity, is not a member of the ILO,1 the two institutions 
have a special relationship based on strong cooperation. In July 2004 the ILO signed a Strategic 
Partnership Framework with the European Commission. The process leading to the signature of the 
Partnership generated several opportunities for closer dialogue between the two institutions and 
has resulted in a substantial volume of funds approved by the Commission for ILO implementation 
through a variety of channels. The EU also actively participates in discussions and negotiations at the 
institutional meetings of the ILO in Geneva. For example, the EU has played a key role in cooperating 
closely with emerging economies, developing countries and social partners during the adoption of 
the June 2008 ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization.  
For the purpose of our article, the EU and the ILO collaborate on external EU issues such as the 
cooperation between the EU and the Asian region, for instance through the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM). In the context of trade negotiations, the EU has urged Asian States to sign up to the ILO core 
conventions as part of the negotiations.  
 
The relationship between the EU interest and its social clauses 
Social norms under EU law have acquired a prominent position within EU policies. In the case 
Deutsche Post/Sievers case (1997) the Court of Justice of the EU held that the “economic aims are 
now only secondary to the social aims”. Nevertheless, the market and trade policy have always been 
in conflict with the social aims of the EU. This is linked to the historical, spasmodic and patchwork 
development of the EU social norms and well as its direct relationship with the market-making 
process. The uneasy relationship continues to create tensions, which also impact on the external 
policy of the EU.  
 
Indeed, the EU sees itself as a world leader in relation to social values and it aims to diffuse these 
values to third countries as stated by the European Commission: “as we pursue social justice and 
                                                          
1
 The member states of the European Union are members of the ILO and signatory parties to most of the ILO 
conventions. 
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cohesion at home, we should also seek to promote our values, including social and environmental 
standards and cultural diversity, around the world.” (European Commission 2006, 5). 
 
Jan Orbie et al. (2005) trace the incorporation of social clauses, in particular the demand that states 
ratify and implement the core ILO conventions, into EU external commercial policy. Initially, these 
matters appeared on the agenda in the context of discussions regarding the EU’s General System of 
Preferences (GSP) regime for granting trade concessions to developing states. As the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) engaged the issue of labour standards in the failed Millennium Round, and in 
the Doha Round negotiations, these too featured more prominently in the EU’s trade policy.  The 
authors suggest that increased international concern with this issue, as encapsulated in the ‘free 
trade versus fair trade debates’ (van Roozendaal, 2002, 67) coincided in time with the election of a 
series of social-democratic governments in Europe in the 1990s more sympathetic to these issues, 
and who were also faced with increased civil activism in favour of fair trade and concerns over rising 
European unemployment and social dumping effects of trade.  As Cyvers and Kerremans (1998, 118) 
point out: “Suddenly the issue became problematic, which gives the impression that the real reason 
of the complaints is not ethical, but rather economic, i.e. a perceived need of protection of some of 
the interests inside the industrialised world.”  
  
Partners’ negative perceptions of social clauses 
The request that partners sign up to the ILO core conventions as part of the trade negotiation has 
not been taken up lightly by Asian States. The EU-Asia relationship was from the outset directly 
linked to the growing economic and political power of the region. The EU therefore is not acting 
from a strong stance in that regards. 
Asian states have argued that developed states’ insistence on labour clauses in trade agreements 
reflect protectionist impulses. As Kevin Kolben (2006) demonstrates developing states have opposed 
this linkage at the WTO invoking claims of Western protectionism, with the West attempting to 
export high labour standards and costs to developing states thus limiting the outsourcing of jobs, 
and limiting job growth in developing states. It is this position that has been reflected even in trade 
union and civil society opposition to these linkages in India. Ole Elgstrom’s (2007, 959) interviews 
with developing states’ officials regarding their views of the EU as a trade negotiator in the WTO 
revealed their suspicions regarding the EU’s linkage of trade with social issues: ‘Many delegates 
seem to have difficulties in believing that this is not done without any ulterior motives and see 
behind these efforts a desire to introduce protectionism, ‘a new bias’, through the back door’.  
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Whilst another delegate from a developing country expressed his doubts by saying, ‘these initiatives 
on human rights and the environment could be positive – but they could also be skewed to give 
advantages to the West’ (In Elgstrom 2007, 959). The later statement reveals a difference, not so 
much on the values, but on the form and implementation of the values, which is consistent with 
concerns raised by non-trade union civil society groups, who likewise oppose the systematic linkage 
of trade preferences and social standards. Naila Kaber (2004), for instance, points out that the 
enforcement of labour standards through trade sanctions could increase labour market inequalities 
through a shift of jobs towards the informal sector where those labour-standards would not be 
applied2 
The increased powers granted to the European Parliament in trade matters under the Treaty of 
Lisbon, have served to heighten Asian states’ concerns about the EU’s approach to linking trade and 
social values through the  “pasarelle clause” or “essential clause” in the EU’s Political Cooperation 
Agremeents (PCAs) or Framework Agreements (FAs) that the EU negotiates with third parties 
alongside the negotiations of FTAs. This clause conditions the application of all other agreements in 
the relationship (including the FTA) to respect for the essential values (human rights, rule of law) 
encapsulated in the clause. Since the 1990s this “essential clause” has been a key element of EU 
agreements with third parties.  
 
However, some EU partners fear that the European Parliament may take a negative view of some of 
their policies, or even future policies they may wish to enact, and initiate procedures to enact the 
suspension of trade preferences under the FTA (interview, Brussels, 24 October 2013) through the 
use of this clause. In the case of negotiations with India, the European Parliament has repeatedly 
expressed the view that any FTA with India should include social clauses. The EP adopted a 
resolution on 26 March 2009 stressing respect for core International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
standards and norms on social and environmental governance. This has been reiterated by the 
resolution of 11 May 2011 that proposes the inclusion of “legally binding clauses on human rights, 
social and environmental standards and their enforcement, with measures in the event of 
infringement” (EP, 2011), a view reiterated by the EESC (2011).3 In particular, some issues that the 
                                                          
2
 These differences in approach have stymied various attempts to include labour standards at the WTO level. 
Instead at the 1996 WTO Singapore Ministerial meeting it was agreed that the ILO, and not the WTO, was the 
appropriate forum for discussions of labour standards. Unlike the WTO, the ILO lacks an enforceable dispute 
settlement mechanism. 
3
 The European Parliament has also stressed that in the interest of consistency and coherence the EU-Canada 
Framework Agreement and Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) must also include the 
linkage, despite Canada’s aggressive opposition to this. At the time of writing CETA’s conclusion has been 
announced but the documents have yet to be made public. 
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EP would like to see include two of the most problematic ones: (i) compliance with eight core 
conventions of the ILO and four priority conventions, and (ii) adherence to internationally agreed 
environmental standards. These could be a potential deal breaker as far as India is concerned given 
India maintains that these are issues to be dealt at appropriate international for a (Khorana & 
Garcia, 2013). 
 
Asian countries’ concerns are not completely unfounded. Historical precedents explain, in part at 
least, the reluctance of Asian States to incorporate social clauses linkages into the FTA. As Hafner-
Burton (2005, 610) shows these linkages do create the space for European actions, such as the 
threat of sanctions, which in itself can be sufficient to garner behavioural changes in partners.   She 
uses the example of Pakistan, which had entered the EU’s Generalised System of Preference (GSP), a 
scheme granting non-reciprocal preferential access to the EU market to imports from developing 
nations, to highlight the risk of threat: 
The EC's generalized system of preferences (GSP) establishes protective labor conditions 
with Pakistan on the importation of certain industrial and agricultural products. Respect for 
worker's rights was established as a condition for tariff preferences. In 1995 the Trades 
Union Confederation mobilized against the government's use of forced child labor, and the 
European Parliament requested an immediate investigation of the misconduct.  Although 
the European Commission deliberated a ban on imports to coerce new policies on child 
labor, it ultimately did not implement a ban. Rather, the Commission chose to pursue 
influence through the threat of a ban coupled with positive incentives for Pakistan's active 
participation in the International Labor Organization's (ILOs) program for the eradication of 
child labor (IPEC). During the proceedings, which continued into 1997, Pakistan introduced 
national legislation outlawing child labor as a direct response to the investigation, and 
subsequently supplied the Commission with regular information of the government's efforts 
to implement the new human rights policies, which remain problematic but are under 
reform. 
 
However, the strong conditionality that is featured in the GSP system is absent in the case of the 
FTAs and PCAs that the EU is negotiating with Asian states. The Agreements with South Korea (2011) 
and with Singapore (2013) incorporate the “linkage” for matters relating to core EU values of human 
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rights and rule of law.4 Issues relating to labour and environmental policies, as encapsulated in the 
sustainability chapter of the FTA, are operationalised in a less coercive and more collaborative 
fashion.5 The chapter is subject to a dispute settlement procedure whereby evidence of breaches in 
one party can be brought forward by the other party, but also by business and civil society from 
either of the two parties. Asian states have reacted variously to the incorporation of civil society in 
these mechanisms, however, as the EU is willing to accept its partners’ definitions for proposed civil 
society groups, the issue has not hampered ongoing negotiations (interviews, Brussels, October 
2013). Once a complaint is brought forward, the Joint Council of the Agreement then appoints a 
panel made up of three experts who will deliberate on the basis of the evidence presented and 
propose a non-binding plan of action based on best practices. In other words, it in their present form 
it would be impossible to use this mechanism to unilaterally suspend trade privileges granted under 
the FTA. This notwithstanding, the European Parliament has made a call for ‘binding’ social clauses 
to be incorporated in the EU-India FTA. It seems unlikely that the European Commission’s 
negotiators will deviate from the procedures they have agreed with South Korea and Singapore, 
however, the European Parliament has to ratify any external agreement the European Union 
negotiates, so they will be a key player in future negotiations. 
Positive outcomes and difference in approach 
The inclusion of social clauses in FTAs and in the negotiations can, however, help to effect change in 
partners by normalising discussions on a particular issue area. In the course of negotiations for an 
EU-Malaysia FTA and PCA, the EU’s insistence on the need for the parties to join the ILO core 
conventions led to an internal review of labour legislation in Malaysia. Malaysian authorities and 
law-makers were forced to consider why their country had not signed the core conventions. Some 
policy-makers initially thought it was their positive discrimination policy for civil service recruitment 
that had precluded them from signing the equality convention. However further investigation 
revealed it was laws from the 1950s preventing women from working in certain sectors that made 
signing the conventions incompatible with domestic legislation. Most civil servants and authorities 
were unaware of the law, as in practical terms it had become out-dated, and is no longer 
implemented. Having detected this matter, the legislative procedures have been put in place to 
repeal the law and enable Malaysia to sign up to the ILO’s core conventions (interview, Brussels, 
October 30, 2013). As this instance reveals, it is not always a case of partners’ rejecting EU values or 
                                                          
4
 It is broadly interpreted that the clause will only be invoked in a case of a strong deterioration of the staus 
quo at the time of the agreement. Singapore, for instance, still has the death penalty in the stature books, 
even though no execution has taken place since 2009.  
5
 As no cases have been brought forward yet we cannot assess the level of commitment of the parties and how 
significant the issue of expert advice and peer pressure will be in enacting behavioural and policy change. 
10 
 
norms, but merely a difference of approach to the same issues. Malaysia’s absence from the ILO 
core conventions was not determined by the prevalence of labour practices in breach of the 
conventions, but merely anachronistic laws and inertia. 
 
The request to insert social clause into trade negotiations also reveals differences in approach 
between the EU and the Asian partners. The EU’s current FTAs and Political Cooperation 
Agreements, offer a ‘light touch’ approach to the matter, by encouraging dialogue and cooperation 
on these issues, and encouraging partners to sign the ILOs four core conventions.  Emile Hafner-
Burton’s  (2005, 595) work on preferential trade agreements and human rights suggests that ‘PTAs 
are more effective than softer human rights agreements (HRAs) in changing repressive behaviors’, 
but only when they ‘supply the instruments and resources to change actors' incentives to promote 
reforms that would not otherwise be implemented’ in terms of coercive measures. In the case of EU 
FTAs and PCAs the only real coercive measure is the ‘essential clause’ which links all agreements to 
respect for human rights, but not labour standards, for instance.  
If in the Malay case, compliance with EU ILO demands has been possible, and even if this is a 
desirable outcome for Malay authorities, it does highlight an important difference in the Asian and 
European approach. The EU approach is based on the institutionalisation of rules, and the 
incorporation into domestic law of international principles and commitments (the ILO conventions 
being a case in point). Asians, however, prefer to discuss and cooperate on these matters, More 
crucially they reject the bundling of these matters into negotiations on trade. Non-European 
diplomats from Asian states expressed their governments’ reluctance to negotiate trade alongside 
matters that are not strictly trade issues in their eyes. Lax environmental and labour regulations can 
have a downward effect on production costs, which may offer an incentive for firm relocation and 
establishment in a particular jurisdiction. To prevent competitive pressures from generating a 
downward spiral effect on labour rights and environmental rules across jurisdictions, developed 
states insist on the inclusion of labour and environmental clauses in their FTAs with all other 
partners, including developing states.  
 
Conclusions 
Based on previous experience with the EU, Asians States are wary and resist the introduction of 
social clause into trade negotiations.  
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Precedents for this can be found within the EU’s General System of Preferences with Pakistan as 
Emile Hafner-Burton (2005, 609). In this case the EU did not even implement the trade penalties, 
instead the threat of implementation sufficed to change the Pakistani’s government position. 
 
However, a significant qualification exists in the case of the EU’s reciprocal FTAs. In these the 
mechanisms for the enactment of the social clause are not as automatic and EU dominated as in the 
case of the conditionality applied in the GSP system. In FTAs the social and environmental clauses 
operate by mutual agreement with the other party. If one party provides evidence of breaches of 
the clause the matter will be examined by a panel of experts (agreed by the parties to the FTA), and 
the panel will make recommendations. These are not legally-binding. The mechanism that has been 
put in place is a dialogue-based one, with broad participation of both policy-makers and business 
and civil society.  
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